In this paper, we proposed a general framework for data poisoning attacks to graphbased semi-supervised learning (G-SSL). In this framework, we first unify different tasks, goals and constraints into a single formula for data poisoning attack in G-SSL, then we propose two specialized algorithms to efficiently solve two important cases -poisoning regression tasks under 2 -norm constraint and classification tasks under 0 -norm constraint. In the former case, we transform it into a nonconvex trust region problem and show that our gradient-based algorithm with delicate initialization and update scheme finds the (globally) optimal perturbation. For the latter case, although it is an NP-hard integer programming problem, we propose a probabilistic solver that works much better than the classical greedy method. Lastly, we test our framework on real datasets and evaluate the robustness of G-SSL algorithms. For instance, on the MNIST binary classification problem (50000 training data with 50 labeled), flipping two labeled data is enough to make the model perform like random guess (around 50% error).
Introduction
Driven by the hardness of labeling work, graph-based semi-supervised learning (G-SSL) [1, 2, 3] has been widely used to boost the quality of models using easily accessible unlabeled data. The core idea behind it is that both labeled and unlabeled data coexist in the same manifold. For instance, in the transductive setting, we have label propagation [1] that transfers the label information from labeled nodes to neighboring nodes according to their proximity. While in the inductive case, a graph-based manifold regularizer can be added to many existing supervised learning models to enforce the smoothness of predictions on the data manifold [4, 5] . G-SSL has received a lot of attention; many of the applications are safety-critical such as drug discovery [6] and social media mining [7] .
We aim to develop systematic and efficient data poisoning methods for poisoning G-SSL models. Our idea is partially motivated by the recent researches on the robustness of machine learning models to adversarial examples [8, 9] . These works mostly show that carefully designed, slightly perturbed inputs -also known as adversarial examples -can substantially degrade the performance of many machine learning models. We would like to tell apart this problem from our setting: adversarial attacks are performed during the testing phase and applied to test data [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] , whereas data poisoning attack is conducted during training phase [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] , and perturbations are added to training data only. In other words, data poisoning attack concerns about how to imperceptibly change the training data to affect testing performance. As we can imagine, this setting is more challenging than testing time adversarial attacks due to the hardness of propagating information through a sophisticated training algorithm.
Despite the efforts made on studying poisoning attack to supervised models [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] , the robustness of semi-supervised algorithms has seldom been studied and many related questions remain unsolved. For instance, are semi-supervised learning algorithms sensitive to small perturbation of labels? And how do we formally measure the robustness of these algorithms?
In this paper, we initiate the first systematic study of data poisoning attacks against G-SSL. We mainly cover the widely used label propagation algorithm, but similar ideas can be applied to poisoning manifold regularization based SSL as well (see Appendix 4.2) . To poison semi-supervised learning algorithms, we can either change the training labels or features. For label poisoning, we show it is a constrained quadratic minimization problem, and depending on whether it is a regression or classification task, we can take a continuous or discrete optimization method. For feature poisoning, we conduct gradient-based optimization with group Lasso regularization to enforce group sparsity (shown in Appendix 4.2). Using the proposed algorithms, we answer the questions mentioned above with several experiments. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a framework for data poisoning attack to G-SSL that 1) includes both classification and regression cases, 2) works under various kinds of constraints, and 3) assumes both complete and incomplete knowledge of algorithm user (also called "victim"). • For label poisoning to regression task, which is a nonconvex trust region problem, we design a specialized solver that can find a global minimum in asymptotically linear time. • For label poisoning attack to classification task, which is an NP-hard integer programming problem, we propose a novel probabilistic solver that works in combination with gradient descent optimizer. Empirical results show that our method works much better than classical greedy methods. • We design comprehensive experiments using the proposed poisoning algorithms on a variety of problems and datasets.
In what follows, we refer to the party running poisoning algorithm as the attacker, and the party doing the learning and inference work as the victim.
Related Work
Adversarial attacks have been extensively studied recently. Many recent works consider the test time attack, where the model is fixed, and the attacker slightly perturbs a testing example to change the model output completely [9] . We often formulate the attacking process as an optimization problem [10] , which can be solved in the white-box setting. In this paper, we consider a different area called data poisoning attack, where we run the attack during training time -an attacker can carefully modify (or add/remove) data in the training set so that the model trained on the poisoned data either has significantly degraded performance [18, 16] or has some desired properties [21, 19] . As we mentioned, this is usually harder than test time attacks since the model is not predetermined. Poisoning attacks have been studied in several applications, including multi-task learning [20] , image classification [21] , matrix factorization for recommendation systems [19] and online learning [22] . However, they did not include semi-supervised learning, and the resulting algorithms are quite different from us.
To the best of our knowledge, [23, 24, 25] are the only related works on attacking semi-supervised learning models. They conduct test time attacks to Graph Convolutional Network (GCN). In summary, their contributions are different from us in several aspects: 1) the GCN algorithm is quite different from the classical SSL algorithms considered in this paper (e.g. label propagation and manifold regularization). Notably, we only use feature vectors and the graph will be constructed manually with kernel function. 2) Their works are restricted to testing time attacks by assuming the model is learned and fixed, and the goal of attacker is to find a perturbation to fool the established model. Although there are some experiments in [24] on poisoning attacks, the perturbation is still generated from test time attack and they did not design task-specific algorithms for the poisoning in the training time. In contrast, we consider the data poisoning problem, which happens before the victim trains a model.
Data Poisoning Attack to G-SSL

Problem setting
We consider the graph-based semi-supervised learning (G-SSL) problem. The input include labeled data X l ∈ R n l ×d and unlabeled data X u ∈ R nu×d , we define the whole features X = [X l ; X u ].
Denoting the labels of X l as y l , our goal is to predict the labels of test data y u . The learner applies algorithm A to predict y u from available data {X l , y l , X u }. Here we restrict A to label propagation method, where we first generate a graph with adjacency matrix S from Gaussian kernel:
, where the subscripts x i(j) represents the i(j)-th row of X. Then the graph Laplacian is calculated by L = D − S, where D = diag{ n k=1 S ik } is the degree matrix. The unlabeled data is then predicted through energy minimization principle [2] min
The problem has a simple closed form solutionŷ u = (D uu − S uu ) −1 S ul y l , where we define D uu = D [0:u,0:u] , S uu = S [0:u,0:u] and S ul = S [0:u,0:l] . Now we consider the attacker who wants to greatly change the prediction result y u by perturbing the training data {X l , y l } by small amounts {∆ x , δ y } respectively, where ∆ x ∈ R n l ×d is the perturbation matrix , and δ y ∈ R n l is a vector. This seems to be a simple problem at the first glance, however, we will show that the problem of finding optimal perturbation is often intractable, and therefore provable and effective algorithms are needed.
To sum up, the problem have several degrees of freedom:
• Learning algorithm: Among all graph-based semi-supervised learning algorithms, we primarily focus on the label propagation method; however, we also discuss manifold regularization method in Appendix 4.2. • Task: We should treat the regression task and classification task differently because the former is inherently a continuous optimization problem while the latter can be transformed into integer programming. • Knowledge of attacker: Ideally, the attacker knows every aspect of the victim, including training data, testing data, and training algorithms. However, we will also discuss incomplete knowledge scenario; for example, the attacker may not know the exact value of hyper-parameters. • What to perturb: We assume the attacker can perturb the label or the feature, but not both. We made this assumption to simplify our discussion and should not affect our findings. • Constraints: We also assume the attacker has limited capability, so that (s)he can only make small perturbations. It could be measured 2 -norm or sparsity. Figure 1 : We show a toy example that illustrates the main idea of the poisoning attack against SSL. By flipping just one training data from positive to negative, the prediction of the whole shaded area will be changed.
Toy Example
We show a toy example in Figure 1 to motivate the data poisoning attack to graph semi-supervised learning (let us focus on label propagation in this toy example). In this example, the shaded region is very close to node-i and yet quite far from other labeled nodes. After running label propagation, all nodes inside the shaded area will be predicted to be the same label as node-i. That gives the attacker a chance to manipulate the decision of all unlabeled nodes in the shaded area at the cost of flipping just one node. For example, in Figure 1 , if we change node-i's label from positive to negative, the predictions in the shaded area containing three nodes will also change from positive to negative.
Besides changing the labels, another way to attack is to perturb the features X so that the graph structure S changes subtly (recall the graph structure is constructed based on pair-wise distances). For instance, we can change the features so that node i is moved away from the shaded region, while more negative label points are moved towards the shaded area. Then with label propagation, the labels of the shaded region will be changed from positive to negative as well. We will examine both cases in the following sections.
A unified framework
The goal of poisoning attack is to modify the data points to maximize the error rate (for classification) or RMSE score (for regression); thus we write the objective as
To see the flexibility of Eq. (2) in modeling different tasks, different knowledge levels of attackers or different budgets, we decompose it into following parts that are changeable in real applications:
• R 1 /R 2 are the constraints on δ y and ∆ x . For example, R 1 = { δ y 2 ≤ d max } restricts the perturbation δ y to be no larger than d max ; while R 1 = { δ y 0 ≤ c max } makes the solution to have at most c max non-zeros. As to the choices of R 2 , besides 2 regularization, we can also enforce group sparsity structure, where each row of ∆ x could be all zeros. • g(·) is the task dependent squeeze function, for classification task we set g(x) = sign(x) since the labels are discrete and we evaluate the accuracy; for regression task it is identity function g(x) = x, and 2 -loss is used. • h(·) controls the knowledge of unlabeled data. If the adversary knows the ground truth very well, then we simply put h(y u ) = y u ; otherwise one has to estimate it from Eq. (1), in other words,
• Ker γ is the kernel function parameterized by γ, we choose Gaussian kernel throughout.
• Similar to S, the new similarity matrix S is generated by Gaussian kernel with parameter γ, except that it is now calculated upon poisoned data X l + ∆ x . • Although not included in this paper, we can also formulate targeted poisoning attack problem by changing min to max and let h(y u ) be the target.
There are two obstacles to solving Eq. 2, that make our algorithms non-trivial. First, the problem is naturally non-convex, making it hard to determine whether a specific solution is globally optimal; secondly, in classification tasks where our goal is to maximize the testing time error rate, the objective is non-differentiable under discrete domain. Besides, even with hundreds of labeled data, the domain space can be unbearably big for brute force search and yet the greedy search is too myopic to find a good solution (as we will see in experiments).
In the next parts, we show how to tackle these two problems separately. Specifically, in the first part, we propose an efficient solver designed for data poisoning attack to the regression problem under various constraints. Then we proceed to solve the discrete, non-differentiable poisoning attack to the classification problem.
Regression task, (un)known label
We first consider the regression task where only label poisoning is allowed. This simplifies Eq. (2) as
Here we used the fact thatŷ u = Ky l , where we define K = (D uu − S uu ) −1 S ul . We can solve Eq. (3a) by SVD; it's easy to see that the optimal solution should be δ y = ±d max v 1 and v 1 is the top right sigular vector if we decompose (D uu − S uu ) −1 S ul = U ΣV . However, (3b) is less straightforward, in fact it is a non-convex trust region problem, which can be generally formulated as
Our case (3b) can thus be described as H = −K K 0 and g = K (y u −ŷ u ). Recently [26] proposed a sublinear time solver that is able to find a global minimum in O(M/ √ ) time. Here
Algorithm 1: Trust region problem solver
Data: Vector g, symmetric indefinite matrix H for problem min z ≤1 1 2 z Hz + g z. Result: Approximate solution z * . 1 Initialize z 0 = −0.5 g g and step size η;
Choose α t by line search and do the following projected gradient descent on sphere;
; 9 end 10 Return z max_iter we propose an asymptotic linear algorithm based purely on gradient information, which is stated in Algorithm 1 and Theorem 6. In Algorithm 1 there are two phases, in the following theorems, we show that the phase I ends within finite iterations, and phase II converges with an asymptotic linear rate. We postpone the proof to Appendix 1.
Then iterates {z t } generated from Algorithm 1 converge to the global minimum. Lemma 1 (Finite phase I). Since H is indefinite, λ 1 = λ min (H) < 0, and v 1 is the corresponding eigenvector. Denote a (1) = a v 1 is the projection of any a onto v 1 , let T 1 be number of iterations in phase I of Algorithm 1, then: 
Classification task
As we have mentioned, data poisoning attack to classification problem is more challenging, as we can only flip an unnoticeable fraction of training labels. This is inherently a combinatorial optimization problem. For simplicity, we restrict the scope to binary classification so that y l ∈ {−1, +1} n l , and the labels are perturbed asỹ l = y l δ y , where denotes Hadamard product and δ y = [±1, ±1, . . . , ±1]. For restricting the amount of perturbation, we replace the norm constraint in Eq. (3a) with integer constraint
where c max is a user pre-defined constant. In summary, the final objective function has the following form
where we define K = (D uu − S uu ) −1 S ul and g(x) = sign(x), so the objective function directly relates to error rate. Notice that the feasible set contains around cmax k=0 n l k solutions, making it almost impossible to do an exhaustive search. A simple alternative is greedy search: first initialize δ y = [+1, +1, . . . , +1], then at each time we select index i ∈ [n l ] and try flip δ y [i] = +1 → −1, such that the objective function (6) decreases the most. Next, we set δ y [i] = −1. We repeat this process multiple times until the constraint in (6) is met.
Doubtlessly, the greedy solver is myopic. The main reason is that the greedy method cannot explore other flipping actions that appear to be sub-optimal within the current context, despite that some sub-optimal actions might be better in the long run. Inspired by the bandit model, we can imagine this problem as a multi-arm bandit, with n l arms in total. And we apply a strategy similar to -greedy: each time we assign a high probability to the best action but still leave non-zero probabilities to other "actions". The new strategy can be called probabilistic method, specifically, we model each action δ y = ±1 as a Bernoulli distribution, the probability of "flipping" is P [δ y = −1] = α. The new loss function is just an expectation over Bernoulli variables
Here we replace the integer constraint in Eq. 6 with a regularizer λ 2 α 2 2 , the original constraint is reached by selecting a proper λ. Once problem (7) is solved, we craft the actual perturbation δ y by setting δ y [i] = −1 if α[i] is among the top-c max largest elements.
To solve Eq. (7), we need to find a good gradient estimator. Before that, we replace g(x) = sign(x) with tanh(x) to get a continuously differentiable objective. We borrow the idea of "reparameterization trick" [27, 28] to approximate B(1, α) by a continuous random vector
where ∆ G ∼ g 1 − g 2 and g 1,2
iid ∼ Gumbel(0, 1) are two Gumbel distributions. τ is the temperature controlling the steepness of sigmoid function: as τ → 0, the sigmoid function point-wise converges to a stair function. Plugging (8) into (7), the new loss function becomes
Therefore, we can easily obtain an unbiased, low variance gradient estimator via Monte Carlo sampling from ∆ G = g 1 − g 2 , specifically
Based on that, we can apply many stochastic optimization methods, including SGD and Adam [29] , to finalize the process. In the experimental section, we will compare the greedy search with our probabilistic approach on real data.
Experiments
In this section, we will show the effectiveness of our proposed data poisoning attack algorithms for regression and classification tasks on graph-based SSL. 
Experimental settings and baselines
We conduct experiments on two regression and two binary classification datasets 1 . The metainformation can be found in Table 4 . We use a Gaussian kernel with width γ to construct the graph. For each data, we randomly choose n l samples as the labeled set, and the rest are unlabeled. We normalize the feature vectors by
x ← (x − µ)/σ, where µ is the sample mean, and σ is the sample variance. For regression data, we also scale the output by y ← (y − y min )/(y max − y min ) so that y ∈ [0, 1]. To evaluate the performance of label propagation models, for regression task we use RMSE metric defined
while for classification tasks we use error rate metric. For comparison with other methods, since this is the first work on data poisoning attack to G-SSL, we proposed several baselines according to graph centrality measures. The first baseline is random perturbation, where we randomly add Gaussian noise (for regression) or Bernoulli noise (for regression) to labels. The other two baselines based on graph centrality scores are more challenging, they are widely used to find the "important" nodes in the graph. Intuitively, we need to perturb "important" nodes to attack the model, and we decide the importance by node degree or PageRank. We explain the baselines with more details in the appendix.
Effectiveness of data poisoning to G-SSL
In this experiment, we consider the white-box setting where the attacker knows not only the ground truth labels y u but also the correct hyper-parameter γ * . We thus apply our proposed label poisoning algorithms in Section 3.4 and 3.5 to attack regression and classification tasks, respectively. In particular, we apply 2 constraint for perturbation δ y in the regression task and use the greedy method in the classification task. The results are shown in Figure 2 Table ( 4) . The left two datasets are regression tasks, and we report the RMSE measure. The right two datasets are classification tasks in which we report the error rate. For each dataset, we repeat the same attacking algorithm w.r.t. different n l 's. Bottom row: compare our poisoning algorithm with three baselines (random noise, degree-based attack, PageRank based attack). We follow our convention that d max is the maximal 2 -norm distortion, and c max is the maximal 0 -norm perturbation.
regression and classification problems, small perturbations can lead to vast differences: for instance, on cadata, the RMSE increases from 0.2 to 0.3 when applied a carefully designed perturbation δ y = 3 (this is very small compared with the norm of label y l ≈ 37.36); More surprisingly, on mnist17, the accuracy can drop from 98.46% to 50% by flipping just 3 nodes. This phenomenon indicates that current graph-based SSL, especially the label propagation method, can be very fragile to data poisoning attacks. On the other hand, using different baselines (shown in Figure 2 , bottom row), the accuracy does not decline much, this indicates that our proposed attack algorithms are more effective than centrality based algorithms.
Moreover, the robustness of label propagation is strongly related to the number of labeled data n l : for all datasets shown in Figure 2 , we notice that the models with larger n l tend to be more resistant to poisoning attacks. This phenomenon arises because, during the learning process, the label information propagates from labeled nodes to unlabeled ones. Therefore even if a few nodes are "contaminated" during poisoning attacks, it is still possible to recover the label information from other labeled nodes.
Hence this experiment can be regarded as another instance of "no free lunch" theory in adversarial learning [30] . We compare the effectiveness of poisoning attacks with and without ground truth labels y u . Recall that if an attacker does not hold y u , (s)he will need to replace it with the estimated valuesŷ u . Thus we expect a degradation of effectiveness due to the replacement of y u , especially whenŷ u is not a good estimation of y u . The result is shown in Figure 3 . Surprisingly, we did not observe such phenomenon: for regression tasks on cadata and E2006, two curves are closely aligned despite that attacks without ground truth labels y u are only slightly worse. For classification tasks on mnist17 and rcv1, we cannot observe any difference, the choices of which nodes to flip are exactly the same (except the c max = 1 case in rcv1). This experiment provides a valuable implication that hiding the ground truth labels cannot protect the SSL models, because the attackers can alternatively use the estimated ground truthŷ u . Figure 4 : Comparing the relative performance of three approximate solvers to discrete optimization problem (6) . For clarity, we also show the relative performance on the right (probabilistic − greedy).
Comparing poisoning with and without truth labels
Comparing greedy and probabilistic method
In this experiment, we compare the performance of three approximate solvers for problem (6) in Section 3.5, namely greedy and probabilistic methods. We choose rcv1 data as oppose to mnist17 data, because rcv1 is much harder for poisoning algorithm: when n l = 1000, we need c max ≈ 30 to make error rate ≈ 50%, whilst mnist17 only takes c max = 5. For hyperparameters, we set c max = {0, 1, . . . , 29}, n l = 1000, γ * = 0.1. The results are shown in Figure 4 , we can see that for larger c max , greedy method can easily stuck into local optima and inferior than our probabilistic based algorithms. Since we use the Gaussian kernel to construct the graph, there is an important hyper-parameter γ (kernel width) that controls the structure of the graph defined in (1) , which is often chosen empirically by the victim through validation. Given the flexibility of γ, it is thus interesting to see how the effectiveness of the poisoning attack degrades with the attacker's imperfect estimation of γ. To this end, we suppose the victim runs the model at the optimal hyperparameter γ = γ * , determined by validation, while the attacker has a very rough estimation γ adv ≈ γ * . We conduct this experiment on cadata when the attacker knows or does not know the ground truth labels y u , the result is exhibited in Figure 5 . It shows that when the adversary does not have exact information of γ, it will receive some penalties on the performance (in RMSE or error rate). However, it is entirely safe to choose a smaller γ adv < γ truth because the performance decaying rate is pretty low. Take Figure 5 for example, even though γ adv = 1 8 γ truth , the RMSE only drops from 0.223 to 0.218. On the other hand, if γ adv is over large, the nodes become more isolated, and thus the perturbations are harder to propagate to neighbors.
Sensitivity analysis of hyper-parameter
Conclusion
We conduct the first comprehensive study of data poisoning to G-SSL algorithms, including label propagation and manifold regularization (in the appendix). The experimental results for regression and classification tasks exhibit the effectiveness of our proposed attack algorithms. In the future, it will be interesting to study poisoning attacks for deep semi-supervised learning models.
A Proof of Convergence
We show that our gradient based nonconvex trust region solver is able to find a global minimum efficiently. First recall the objective function
Suppose H has decomposition n i=1 λ i v i v i and rank λ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ λ i ≤ 0 ≤ · · · ≤ λ n . We only focus on "easy case": in which case g (1) = g v 1 = 0 and v 1 is the corresponding eigenvector of λ 1 = λ min (H). In opposite, the hard case g (1) = 0 is hardly seen in practice due to rounding error, and to be safe we can also add a small Gaussian noise to g. To see the structure of solution, suppose the solution is z * , then by KKT condition, we can get the condition of global optima
By condition λ 1 < 0, further if g (1) = 0, then λ ≥ −λ 1 and z * = 1. Because g (1) = 0, which implies λ > −λ 1 . Immediately we know z * = −(H + λI d ) −1 g and λ is the solution of n i=1 ( g (i) λi+λ ) 2 = 1. As a immediate application of (12), we can conclude the following lemma: Lemma 3. Considering the first stage, when iterates {z t } are inside unit sphere z t 2 ≤ 1, i.e. under the update rule z t+1 = z t − η∇f (z t ), and under assumption that z t ∇f (z t ) ≤ 0, we will have z t H∇f (z t ) ≥ βz t ∇f (z t ) (recall we define β as the operator norm of H).
Proof. We first define w
solving this geometric series, we get:
suppose at t-th iteration we have w
t+1 , after plugging in Eq. (15) and noticing 0 < ηλ i < 1
Furthermore, from Assumption 2 we know that w
0 then by Eq. (16) we know 1 − ηλ i ≥ 1 ⇔ ηλ i ≤ 0 leading to a contradiction, so it must hold that
At the same time, the eigenvalues are nondecreasing, λ j ≥ λ i for j ≥ i, which means 1 − ηλ j ≤ 1.
Also recalling the initialization condition implies w
0 , subtracting both sides by 1/ηλ j and noticing λ j ≥ λ i
Combining Eq. (17) with Eq. (18), we can conclude that if w
holds, then such relation also holds for index j > i
To apply Theorem 6, we need to check λ H,min > 0. To do that we can directly calculate its value, by the definition of Riemanndian Hessian, we have
Then for ξ ∈ T x M,
we then expand f (R x (tξ)) to,
By differentiating t twice and set t = 0 (this can be done by software), we finally get
Taking x = z * into above equation, we get
On the other hand, by optimal condition (12), we have:
so
in "easy-case", g (1) = 0, so λ 1 + λ = 0 and Hessian condition in (12) can be improved to λ 1 + λ > 0.
Based on above discussion, we know λ H,min ≥ λ + λ 1 > 0 and λ H,max ≤ λ + λ n .
B Supplementary Experiments on Trust Region Solver
We sample an indefinite random matrix by H = BB − λI n , where B ∈ R n×(n−1) and B ij iid ∼ N (0, 1), obviously λ min (H) = λ 1 = −λ. Afterwards we sample a vector g by g i iid ∼ N (0, 1). it is totally fine to ignore the hard case, because the probability is zero. By changing the value of λ in {10, 30, 50, 70, 90, 110}, we plot the function value decrement with respect to number of iterations in Figure 6 (left). As we can see, the iterates first stay inside of the sphere (phase I) for a few iterations and then stay on the boundary (phase II). To inspect how λ changes the duration of phase I, we then plot the number of iterations it takes to reach phase II, under different λ values shown in Figure 6 (right). Recall in (23) , number of iterations is bounded as a function of λ, which can be further simplified to:
where we set z (1) 0 = 0 to simplify the formula. By fitting the data point with function T (λ) = log(1+c1λ) log(1+c2λ) , we find our bounds given by Lemma 6 is quite accurate.
C Baselines
There are three baselines included in the experiments, namely random noise, degree-based poisoning and PageRank-based poisoning. The first baseline, random noise, is the simplest one. For continuous label, the perturbation is created by δ y = d max 2 with ∼ N (0, 1); for discrete label, we randomly choose c max indices {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k cmax } from {1, 2, . . . , n} and then set δ y [k i ] = −1.
As to degree-based poisoning, we first calculate the degree vector deg[i] = n j=1 S ij of all nodes, then for continuous label we load the perturbation weighted by degree, i.e. |δ y [i]| = , and the sign of δ y [i] is determined by the gradient of loss on δ y at δ y = 0. Specifically:
this makes sure that the direction is good enough to increase the prediction loss of SSL models. For discrete label, we simply choose the largest c max training labels to flip: δ y [i] = −1 if and only if node-i has many neighboring nodes. This is to maximize the influence of perturbations.
Similarly, we can also a PageRank based poisoning attack, the only difference is that we use PageRank to replace the degree score.
D Supplementary Experiments on Data Poisoning Attacks
In this section, we design more experiments on other cases that are not able show up in the main text. The problem settings and datasets are the same as previous experiments.
D.1 Sparse and group sparse constraint
In reality, the adversary may only be able to perturb very small amount of data points, this requirement renders sparse constraint. In specific, we consider
The constraint on R 2 implies that only a limited number of data can be perturbed, so we enforce a row-wise group sparsity. Both R 1 and R 2 can be added to regression/classification tasks, below we take regression task as an example to show the effectiveness.
For R 1 , the optimization problem is essentially a sparse PCA problem
For this kind of problem, many efficient solvers were proposed during the past decades, including threshold method [31] , LASSO based method [32] , or by convex relaxation [33] .
In order to solve the sparse PCA problem, we adopt the LASSO based sparse PCA solver [32] . We conduct the experiment on cadata and E2006 data, then plot the sparsity (measured by #nnz of Figure 8 : We ranked the perturbations ∆ l by their 2 -norm, to see the decay rate of distortion. δ y ) and corresponding RMSE in Figure 7 . For comparison, we also include the RMSE when no 0 sparsity constraint is enforced. Interestingly, we observe that the RMSE increases rapidly as δ y is relatively sparse, and later it gradually stabilizes before reaching the same RMSE of dense solution. That is to say, when attackers have constraint on the maximal number of perturbation they could make, our sparse PCA based solution is able to make a good trade-off between sparsity and RMSE.
For R 2 , the har dconstraint is replaced with a group LASSO regularizer λ n l i=1 ∆ l [i, :] 2 and we use proximal gradient descent to solve the optimization problem. By changing the hyper-parameter λ we can indirectly change the group sparsity of ∆ x . As above, we run the experiment on mnist17 data, result is shown in Figure 8 .
D.2 Data poisoning attack on manifold regularization model
Apart from label propagation model for semi-supervised learning, our method can also be seamlessly applied to manifold regularization method [4] . Manifold regularization based SSL solves the following optimization problem
where F is the set of model functions. (x i , y i ) is the i-th data pair in (X, y), (ŷ, y) is the loss function. The model family F ranges from linear models f (x) = w x to very complex deep neural networks. If we limit our scope to the linear case, then (33) has a closed form solution:
w * = (X l X l + λI + βX LX) −1 X l y l = P y l
where X l is the feature matrix of all labeled nodes, X is the feature matrix of labeled and unlabeled nodes, L is the graph Laplacian.
Manifold regularization term in (34) enforces two nodes that are close to each other (i.e. large S ij ) to hold similar labels, and that is similar to the objective of label propagation. This motivates us to extend our algorithms for attacking label propagation to attack manifold regularization based SSL.
As an example, we discuss poisoning attack to manifold regularization model for regression task, where the problem can be formulated as
Clearly, Eq. (35) is again a non-convex trust region problem, and we can apply our trust region problem solver to it. For experiment, we take regression task on cadata as an example, different from label propagation, manifold regularization learns a parametric model f w (x) that is able to generalize to unseen graph. So for manifold regularization we can do label poisoning attack in both transductive and inductive settings. The experiment result is shown in Figure 9 . Figure 9 : Experiment result of manifold regularization on cadata, here we set n l = 500, n u = 3500 and the rest n g = 4000 data are used for inductive learning.
In this experiment, we do both transductive setting, using the test set {X u , y u } as in label propagation, and inductive setting, on a brand new set {X ind , y ind } that never been accessed in training stage. We can see that for both settings the label poisoning attack algorithm has equally good performance.
